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Introduction
This paper stems from two broad streams of finance and accounting literature. The first one investigates the role of institutional investors in security markets and was initiated by the well documented growth in institutional ownership (see for example, Gompers and Metrick, 2001 ). The second stream investigates the information content of accounting disclosures which has triggered a vivid discussion on the topic since Beaver's (1968) seminal paper on market reaction to earnings announcements. We investigate the relation between institutional ownership and the information content of earnings surprises using data from the Polish stock market. We investigate whether price, volatility, and volume reactions during the earnings announcement windows are correlated with pension funds' stake in a company.
Institutional investors, as a group, can benefit from economies of scale and, consequently, can be more efficient in processing information. Hakansson (1977) develops a model with several investor groups which differ in their ability and/or their resources to conduct fruitful search for information. Investors with unusual detective abilities and large resources can benefit from undisclosed interim information, while investors with low detective skills and/or limited resources rely solely on public information. According to Lev (1988) , economies of scale play a major role in the value of information. Acquisition and processing of information may not be economically justifiable at low levels of investment, whereas becoming informed is profitable when the scale of investment activities is large.
Information advantage of institutions may also arise from selective disclosure of important information by public companies to securities market professionals and certain institutional investors before making full disclosure to the public. This practice by the U.S.
companies was the source of concern for the Securities and Exchange Commission, which adopted new rules to address the issue in October 2000. According to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), if a company discloses nonpublic information to any person, it should also make a public disclosure of this information. 3 Competition in the asset management industry can create pressure to improve performance and achieve higher returns through searching for private information. It is also conceivable that institutions have access to the same amount of information as the public, but they are able to process it more efficiently. This information advantage preempts the content of scheduled earnings announcements and the funds trading incorporates the pertinent information into asset prices before it is reflected in earnings innovations. Consequently, one can expect the magnitude of market reaction to the announcement to be decreasing with the level of institutional ownership in a firm.
Previous studies on the U.S. market provide mixed evidence on the role of institutional shareholders in the market impact of earnings surprises. El-Gazzar (1998) finds that price reaction around earnings announcement is inversely related to the institutional investors' ownership level in a firm. El-Gazzar interprets this evidence as supportive of the hypothesis that institutions have a strong incentive to search for private predisclosure information and induce a higher level of voluntary interim disclosure. El-Gazzar's findings are corroborated by Ayers and Freeman (2003) who find that stock prices of firms with high institutional ownership incorporate earnings information earlier than the prices of firms with low institutional ownership. On the other hand, Potter (1992) finds a positive association between institutional ownership and stock price variability around earnings disclosure. Potter concludes that the alternative information collected by institutional investors does not preempt that conveyed by earnings announcements. The results of Potter's study are supported by Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) for negative earnings announcements, who additionally investigate the volume reaction around the announcements and find that the reaction is greater for companies with higher institutional ownership.
The Polish stock market, due to its unique institutional setting and investor composition creates new research opportunities to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and the market reaction to earnings news. Polish pension funds, 4 established in 1999 within a comprehensive pension system reform, constitute a homogenous and highly competitive investor group, which accounts for about 20% of the free float on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Their functioning is strictly regulated, furthermore, the legal investment limits induce similar behaviour on the part of the fund managers. This homogeneity enables us to overcome an issue noted by Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) and Dennis and Strickland (2002) , who find that different types of institutions have different characteristics, which in turn dictate their trading behaviour and thus their impact on market.
Moreover, strong competition among pension funds is implied by a minimum required rate of return, which is set every quarter by the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission (KNUiFE).
Given the unique institutional setting in Poland, and considering the homogeneity of Polish funds, our first hypothesis is whether pension fund managers in Poland have any information advantage over the general trading public. This test, therefore, provides new insights into the importance of information for different classes of equity investors in Eastern European markets. The previous findings from the U.S. market might not apply to continental Europe due to the differences in institutional settings. The US security markets are the most developed and sophisticated in the world and substantial amount of resources are spent on investment analysis and research. Furthermore, the US accounting system is primarily designed to satisfy the information needs of current and prospective shareholders. Regulations in the newly established Eastern European markets, like the Germanic model, are designed for a wider group of stakeholders other than capital market investors. This design limits the scope and clarity of freely available knowledge about companies and subsequently increases the importance of expertise to collect and process information. These institutional differences make Eastern European funds more significant traders and their trading behavior more informative in the market place.
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If fund managers in Poland are shown to have superior information relative to small and disorganized individual traders, as El-Gazzar (1998) and Ayers and Freeman (2003) Lev's (1988) economies of scale to acquire public information and process it more efficiently than the small trader can? Or is it that competitive pressures force them to acquire the level and type of information that is not generally or immediately available to the public? This possibility is, at least theoretically, conceivable in Eastern Europe. In the Polish setting, even though insider trading and disclosure laws generally follow western standards, the law enforcement is not as meticulous. Polish regulations prohibit disclosure of material information undisclosed to the public and ad-hoc information disclosure requirements obligate companies to promptly release to the public any information that may substantially affect the stock price (similar to German regulations). However, given the recent nature of FD regulations, the laws may not be current enough for modern practices and enforcement may not be sufficient.
Thus our second hypothesis is whether the Polish fund managers have access to more information than the public prior to the public announcement of earnings, or are they just more sophisticated in processing the same information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of the Polish stock market and presents pension funds as an important investor group in Poland. The data and methodology are described in Section 3. Section 4 follows with the empirical findings on the relation between the market reaction to earnings announcements and pension funds holdings, and section 5 concludes the paper. Although the market has drawn substantial interest from foreign investors, domestic individual investors were the most active market participants during the 90's (WSE, 2003) .
The introduction of a comprehensive social security reform package on January 1, 1999 was a milestone for the market. Closely following the Chilean model, the state-administrated scheme based on a pay-as-you-go retirement system was enriched with an investment-based component of individual retirement accounts set up with privately owned pension funds, which invest on the stock and bond market. Under the new system, employees are obligated to invest 7.3% of their pre-tax income in a professionally managed mutual-fund style company of their choice. 21 funds got required licences and started operating in 1999 and their number has decreased to 17 since then, due to the on-going consolidation.
The government imposed legal regulations and supervision to ensure safety and effectiveness of the funds' investments and the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission ( KNUiFE) was established as a supervisory body. The detailed regulations include investment limits and a mandatory minimum rate of return. Investments in listed shares are limited to 40 percent of the funds' assets, and additionally a certain level of portfolio diversification is required. KNUiFE defines a minimum rate of return on pension funds based on the ex-post funds performance in the prior 24 months on a rolling basis every quarter. This minimum acceptable performance rate is the lower of ½ of the mean pension funds rate of return over the two-year window or 400 basis points below this mean. If a fund falls below the threshold, the managing company has to cover the difference from its own resources.
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On the one hand, the Polish pension fund regulations imply similar investment strategies across funds since each fund is obligated to follow certain portfolio management guidelines. On the other hand, the pressure to avoid falling below the minimum rate of return and to increase income by attracting new clients creates financial incentives to constantly improve performance. Consequently, fund managers seek information which would give them an advantage over competition. They may also want to actively monitor companies held in their portfolios and attempt to exert control over the management of these companies to enforce shareholder value maximizing behaviour. Table 1 , we can conjecture that pension funds account for a much larger share of equity trading now.
[ Table 1 around here] Table 1 
Data and Methodology
The sample consists of stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the period 1999-2002 for which the I/B/E/S data on earnings forecasts and actual earnings for at least 9 one year was available. As for other small markets, I/B/E/S provides only annual earnings forecasts for Polish companies. The WSE provided daily closing prices and trading volumes, as well as stock indices, dividends, market capitalisation and market-to-book data. The announcement dates were collected from the Emitent Information System, which is officially used by Polish public companies for news dissemination. The system was searched for fourth quarter earnings announcements since they convey information on a company's annual earnings. This date was used as the announcement date for the ( Pension funds holding in a company, PFH, is measured as a percentage of shares outstanding held by the funds at the beginning of a calendar year. The natural logarithm of a firm's market capitalisation, SIZE, and a market-to-book ratio, MB, are calculated two days prior to the announcement. NOEST is the number of earnings forecasts (or analysts) on the I/B/E/S tape for a given company in the month prior to the earnings disclosure.
We employ three reaction metrics: abnormal returns, abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume. Return-based measures are typically used in the literature to capture the valuation impact of an event, while the volume metric indicates the extent to which the event directly affects trading decisions (Cready and Hurtt, 2002) . Bamber and Cheon (1995) 10 note that even though price and volume metrics are correlated, they convey different information and should be examined together in the information-content oriented research.
Price changes reflect average changes in investors' beliefs, while in contrast, trading volume is the aggregate investors' reaction to the announcement (Beaver, 1968; Kim and Verrecchia, 1991) .
The stock price reaction to the earnings announcement is measured by means of the standard event study methodology. The market model is estimated for every announcement on the basis of the daily log returns during the 120-day pre-listing period from day -150 to day -31 relative to the event day. The WIG index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The WIG is a value-weighted, total return index, which covers companies that account for 99% of the WSE capitalisation. Abnormal returns for stocks are calculated for each day during t-30 to t+30 peiod as:
[ ]
where it AR is company i's abnormal return on day t, it R and mt R denote the day t dividend and split adjusted returns on company i and the market index, respectively. i α and i β are the parameters of the market model for company i. Daily abnormal returns are averaged across positive and negative surprises and cumulated for various windows. This way, we can observe the price behaviour prior and after the event, as well as on days surrounding the announcement.
We run the following price-earnings response regressions:
where CAR(p,q) is cumulative abnormal return over the window running from day p to day q relative to the announcement date and FE is the forecast error. HPFH is a dummy that takes the value of one when pension funds holding is above its sample median, and zero otherwise. Following Landsman and Maydew (2002) and Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) , we define abnormal volatility for the company i's return on day t in the following way:
where it AR is a market model adjusted return of company i on day t and We define abnormal volume of trading in company i's shares on day t as
This formulation follows Landsman and Maydew (2002) . Daily turnover, it V , is a number of shares of firm i traded during day t divided by the number of shares outstanding. The relationship between the market reaction metrics and pension funds holding is captured in a set of pooled regressions which control for factors recognised in the literature to have impact on the information content of scheduled public disclosures. These factors include firm size, the number of analysts following the stock, and market-to-book ratio. Larger firms are likely to produce and disseminate more information in the interim period and, as a consequence, their earnings announcements convey less new information ( Atiase, 1985) .
Similarly, the information content of an announcement is expected to be negatively related to the number of financial analysts who follow the stock (Shores, 1990) . The market-to-book ratio reflects a firm's growth opportunities which are sensitive to news on current performance. Consequently, announcements and surprises by growth companies may convey more relevant information than disclosures by value companies (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003) .
The changes in volatility in response to the earnings surprises are measured in following regressions: Table 1 ). Note that the firms in our sample are large companies that are of interest to analysts, and thus appear on the I/B/E/S tape. Small companies are less likely to be followed by analysts, which is reflected in a high positive correlation coefficient (0.71) between the number of issued forecasts and firm size. The relationship is in line with earlier studies on the U.S. market (e.g. Bhushan, 1989) .
Empirical Results

Descriptive statistics
[ Table 2 around here]
Pension funds hold up to a quarter of the sample companies' shares outstanding, with the mean of about 4%. The mean and median forecast errors are negative during this study period. Analysts are likely to be systematically optimistic and actual earnings tend to fail the median forecast, which is consistent with the findings of Easterwood and Nutt (1999) . The magnitude of the forecast error is significantly negatively related to the firm size. Larger companies are more transparent, provide more interim information (Atiase, 1985) and are followed by a larger number of analysts, all of which lead to forecast accuracy.
The mean abnormal return volatility, AVAR01, exceeds 2.0 and indicates increased market volatility around the announcement. Additionally, we find positive mean abnormal trading volume, AVOL01. These results show that earnings announcements, on average, convey new information. Both measures are negatively correlated with pension funds holding, 14 which suggests that pension funds holding reduces the impact of information contained in the announcements. This finding is consistent with the findings of El-Gazzar (1998). Moreover, we find that growth stocks react stronger to earnings news, as reflected by statistically significant positive correlation between abnormal volume, AVOL01, and market-to-book ratio, MB. The finding corroborates the notion that current earnings provide information about growth prospects of a firm and, consequently, growth companies are likely to be more sensitive to earnings information (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003) .
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Earnings Response Coefficients
Our first question was whether fund managers have any information advantage over the public around the time of earnings announcements. To test this hypothesis, we partition our pooled sample based on the value of pension funds holding (high ownership if PFH is greater that its sample median and low ownership if PFH is smaller than its sample median).
The market responses to the announcements would reveal the information content of earnings surprises in the two sub-samples, and thus whether fund managers have any information advantage over the general trading public.
Our second question is the nature of information advantage that fund managers may have. Assuming that fund managers are competitive and competent, they would collect all available information and would process it thoroughly. They would buy/sell if the information points to a potential price change. The magnitude of their response to the news would, therefore, be proportional to the quality and value of data and not to sign of prospective price change. To look into this issue, we divide our sample into two sub-samples based on the sign of the forecast error. The market response for the high pension funds ownership stocks in the two sub-samples could reveal information about the nature of pension fund managers' information advantage. If the responses in two events are about the same, then we can conclude that the fund managers are superior in acquiring and/or processing information 15 (public or private) and use this superiority regardless of whether the upcoming news is good or bad. However, if there is an asymmetrical response to announcements in the positive and negative news sub-samples, then we can rule out the possibility that they have an unconditional informational superiority (resulting from public or private information, or better models).
Cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates are summarised in Table 3 . We expect the immediate market reaction to the disclosure to be reflected in stock prices on the day of the announcements or on the following day when the information receives wide media attention. Over those two days, we find that there is a positive response of 1%, on average, when a company reports earnings above the consensus forecast. In the case of negative forecast errors, the reaction is -1.5%. Earnings disclosures move stock prices in the direction consistent with the sign of a forecast error, thus we conclude the overall, they have some new information.
[ Table 3 around here]
The whole sample results indicate that there is a significant price run-up in the month before the scheduled announcements (-30 to -6 window) for both positive and negative One possible explanation for this asymmetry is that company managers use discretion not to reveal unfavourable information until the obligatory deadlines. Unless there is a disclosure constraint, managers seem to have a tendency to withhold the information that is deemed to be adverse. This supports our notion that companies provide pre-disclosure information discriminately, both with respect to the type of information and with respect to the recipients. They prefer to release the good news, and when they do, they are likely to share it with fund managers. In the post-event period, like the results in the whole sample, there is no correction when the earnings surprise is positive and significant price corrections up to five days later, when the earnings surprise is not.
To summarise, Table 3 provides some interesting observations about our high pension fund holdings sub-sample. In the pre-announcement period, when the forthcoming news is positive, prices move up significantly, but when it is negative, they do not significantly drop.
The asymmetry could also be seen at the announcement. When the news is good, there is no surprise, but when the news is bleak, there is a surprise in the market. This may have some 17 information about the nature of information asymmetry between fund managers and other traders.
Further light is shed on the impact of pension fund holdings on the stock price behaviour around earnings announcements through the analysis of Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC). Whereas CARs indicate whether stock prices react to the event, ERCs describe the relation between the price reaction and the magnitude of the earnings surprise.
The estimated coefficients of regression (2) are presented in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 around here]
We find significant response to the magnitude of the surprise in the low pension funds ownership sub-sample. Abnormal price behaviour is associated with the magnitude of the earnings innovations in both positive and negative forecast error sub-samples, with the ERCs in the window (0, 5) being significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The movements in prices of stocks largely held by pension funds seem not to be related to the size of the earnings surprise. A possible explanation is the smaller information content of scheduled disclosures for pension funds managers, which corroborates Table 3 results and supports the hypothesis that fund managers have an information advantage over other traders. The fund managers may have access to private information prior to the disclosure, which is indicated by the ERC for the week preceding earnings disclosures, i.e. window (-5, -1). The coefficient in the high ownership group (for the whole sample) is significant at the 10% level, whereas in the low ownership group it is not different from zero. However, the difference between both groups is not significant.
Taken together, Table 4 results show that earnings announcements convey less new information for the fund managers and stocks largely held by pension funds seem to incorporate the earnings surprises before the public release of the pertinent information.
Return volatility and trading volume around the announcement
In this section, abnormal return volatility over windows (0, 1) and (0, 5) relative to the disclosure date, AVAR01 and AVAR05, and abnormal trading volume over these windows, AVOL01 and AVOL05, are used to analyse the determinants of the information content of earnings announcements. These measures are regressed on a set of predictor variables (models 5 and 6), and the estimated coefficients are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 .
[ Table 5 and Table 6 around here]
The regression results support the findings of the pair-wise correlation analysis.
Controlling for other factors, pension funds holding, PFH, remains an important determinant of the market reaction to earnings news. The reaction measured with both the abnormal return volatility and the abnormal trading volume decreases significantly with pension funds concentration, and the coefficients are significant at the 5% levels in every model specification. These results are in line with findings by El-Gazzar (1998) for the U.S. market and suggest that the pension funds play a stabilising force in the market place, which in turn may be caused by their prior exposure to the pertinent news. If pension funds managers are privy to undisclosed information before the public announcement of such information, the information gets reflected in the stock price, and thus at announcement would not have as much impact. Consequently, scheduled announcements convey less new data for the market when the share of stock held by the funds is larger.
The estimated coefficients for firm size and number of analysts following the stock are negative for both volume and volatility regressions. But the coefficients are generally insignificant, except for the firm size over the five days after the announcement. The information content of the announcements is lower for larger stocks and for stocks with 19 higher analyst coverage. These results support the notion that large companies disseminate more pre-disclosure information and therefore are more transparent (Atiase, 1985) . Similarly, the greater number of analysts following a company results in a better company visibility in the interim period. Moreover, the reaction is stronger for growth companies, as reflected in the positive coefficients at the market-to-book ratio, MB.
Summary and Conclusions
We analyse the impact of institutional investors ownership concentration on the market reaction around corporate earnings announcements. Abnormal returns, abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volume are used as proxies for the reaction. The data come from the Polish stock market, where pension funds established in 1999 within the general pension system reform form a homogenous and highly competitive investor class with an increasing share in the stock market capitalisation.
We find that pension funds have some information advantage over other investors, but the advantage is not unconditional. We can observe that prices of stocks largely held by pension funds do not reflect any new information at the announcement of good news which may indicate that investors are not surprised by the disclosure and the conveyed information is already incorporated into prices. However, the pension funds managers are as surprised as other traders when the earnings surprises are negative. This, we attribute to the notion that company managers may be providing pension funds with information in a selective fashion.
When the news is good, they share the information quickly, but when the news is not flattering, they hold on to it until the obligatory deadline.
Moreover, we find that the magnitude of price changes for stocks with lower pension funds ownership tend to be related to the size of earnings surprise, while prices of stocks with higher funds holdings seem to be driven by a different set of information. Pension funds managers may have access to information in the interim period. Over a few days directly 20 preceding the disclosure, prices of stocks with large pension funds ownership incorporate a part of earnings innovation, which further supports the possibility of information release to fund managers.
Our data on abnormal return volatility and abnormal trading volumes support the findings that a larger share of pension funds in the company's shareholders base reduces the extent of new information conveyed by the announcement. Pension funds holding, as measured by the percentage of the shares outstanding held by funds, is a significant determinant of the market reaction to accounting disclosures, after controlling for firm size, number of analysts following the stock, magnitude of the earnings surprise and market-tobook ratio.
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the markets impound information in stock prices, where large institutional investors hold and trade large quantities of shares of stock. Mean market-to-book ratio of companies held by pension funds 2.0 1.9 1.4
Median market-to-book ratio of companies held by pension funds 1.3 1.2 1.0
Mean holdings (% of shares outstanding) 1.6% 4.7% 8.3%
Median holdings (% of shares outstanding) 0.9% 3.9% 6.3%
Data were obtained from the Warsaw Stock Exchange, the Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Commission, and from the pension funds. The sample includes 124 earnings announcements by Polish companies from the period 2000-2002. SIZE is the natural logarithm of company's market capitalisation (in PLN mil) measured two days prior to the earnings announcement. PFH is the percentage of shares outstanding held by pension funds. FE is the difference between actual earnings and median analysts' forecast, deflated by the stock price two days prior to the announcement. ABSFE is the absolute value of FE. NOEST is the number of earnings forecasts in the month prior to the announcement. MB is market to book ratio. AVAR01, abnormal return volatility, is calculated as the sum of squared standardised market model residuals on days 0 to 1 relative to the earnings announcement day. AVOL01, is abnormal trading volume measured as the sum of abnormal share turnover on days 0 to 1 relative to the earnings announcement day. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. (models ii and iv). The dependent variable is abnormal return volatility. It is calculated as the sum of squared standardised market model residuals on days 0 to 1 (models i and ii) and 0 to 5 (models iii and iv) relative to the earnings announcement day. The market model estimation window runs from days -150 to -31 relative to the announcement day. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the company's market capitalisation measured two days prior to the earnings announcement. PFH is the percentage of shares outstanding held by pension funds. ABSFE is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and median analysts' forecast, deflated by the stock price two days prior to the announcement. NOEST is the number of earnings forecasts in the month prior to the announcement. MB is market to book ratio. The sample includes 124 earnings announcements by Polish companies from the period 2000-2002.
*** , ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. (models ii and iv). The dependent variable is abnormal trading volume measured as the sum of abnormal share turnover on days 0 to 1 (models i and ii) and 0 to 5 (models iii and iv) relative to the earnings announcement day. Abnormal share turnover on a given day is calculated as the company's share turnover (trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) that day less its mean in the estimation window with the difference scaled by standard deviation of daily turnover in the estimation window. The estimation window runs from days -150 to -31 relative to the announcement day. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the company's market capitalisation measured two days prior to the earnings announcement. PFH is the percentage of shares outstanding held by pension funds. ABSFE is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings and median analysts' forecast, deflated by the stock price two days prior to the announcement. NOEST is the number of earnings forecasts in the month prior to the announcement. MB is market to book ratio. The sample includes 124 earnings announcements by Polish companies from the period 2000-2002. *** and ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
